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If the court determines that the child committed the delinquent act, a separate disposition hearing is conducted. MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-820(a)
(1984). Clearly, Maryland law allows entry
of a judgment of restitution at an adjudicatory hearing. Moreover, there is no statutory requisite that a child be adjudged a delinquent prior to ordering restitution.
Here, at the adjudicatory hearing, the
court found that appellant had committed
a delinquent act. At the dispositional hearing, the court found that appellant was not
a delinquent child. However, since appellant was found to have committed a delinquent act during which he stole, damaged
and destroyed the property of another, the
court properly ordered restitution.
-Marilys Fernandez

In Re Herbert B.: RESTITUTION
IN JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
In the case of In Re Herbert B., 303 Md.
419, 494 A.2d 680 (1985), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to
consider whether a judgment of restitution
was proper for damages caused by a juvenile even though the court found as a matter of fact that the juvenile was not a delinquent and dismissed the matter.
In 1982, a laundromat located in Prince
George's County was broken into and certain property damaged. The appellant,
sixteen-year-old Herbert B., was apprehended. At an adjudicatory hearing conducted by the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County, sitting as a juvenile
court, appellant was found to have been involved in storehouse breaking, petty theft,
and destruction of private property. The
court ordered an investigation and report
to be completed by the Juvenile Services
Administration, imposed court costs, and
ordered a restitution hearing.
A restitution hearing was held and restitution in the amount of $228.50 was recommended. Later, at a disposition hearing,
the court determined as a matter of fact
that despite the commission of a delinquent
act, appellant was not a delinquent child
and therefore was not in need of treatment
or guidance and the matter was dismissed.
Nevertheless, the court directed appellant
and his mother to pay $228.50 restitution
to the owner of the laundromat.
The issue raised on appeal was whether
a court could enter a judgment of restitution after a case had been dismissed. The
court of special appeals held that MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 3-829(a) (1984) established the necess~ry
criteria for a judgment of restitution: first,
that the child committed a delinquent act;
26- The Law Forum/Winter, 1986

secondly, that the property of another was
destroyed, stolen or damaged. Because the
appellant satisfied these criteria, the court
of special appeals affirmed the lower court's
decision. See, In Re Herbert B., 58 Md.
App. 24, 472 A.2d 95 (1984).
Similarly, the court of appeals rejected
appellant's argument and held that, although the lower court decided that the
child was not delinquent and that "the
matter will stand dismissed," this was
meant as an indication for the record that
the child was not delinquent. Thus, the
court was not acting upon the petition itself but merely determining the underlying issue in the dispositional hearing.
Additionally, appellant argued that the
court at the dispositional hearing had to
find him a "delinquent child" before it
could enter a judgment of restitution under Section 3-829(a). MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. (1984). The court
rejected this contention citing section
3-829(a). The court stated that the plain
language of section 3-829(a) clearly did
not require that a child be adjudicated a
delinquent as a prerequisite for ordering
restitution. Furthermore, section 3-829( e)
states that a restitution hearing may be
held "as part of" or "contemporaneously
with" either the adjudicatory or dispositional hearing. See, In Re Dan D., 57 Md.
App. 522, 528, 470 A.2d 1318, 1321
(1984). The court in an adjudicatory hearing does not sit to determine whether a
child is delinquent or not. Rather, the primary purpose of this particular hearing is
to hear the merits of the allegations in
the petition. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-80l(b)(1984); See, InRe
Ernest J., 52 Md. App, 56,60,447 A.2d
97, 100 (1982). In other words, an adjudicatory hearing is to determine whether the
child committed the delinquent act alleged.

City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc.: THE COURT
REJECTS MENTAL RETARDATION
AS A SUSPECT CLASS
In City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985),
the Supreme Court of the United States recently held that mental retardation is not a
quasi-suspect classification for equal protection clause purposes, and thus the Constitution requires only that legislation relating to this classification be rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. Mentally retarded persons, because of their
reduced capacity to function in the everyday world, differ from other persons, and
the states' interests in dealing with them
and providing for them are clearly legitimate ones. The Court reasoned that the
mere "rational basis" standard of judicial
review affords government the necessary
latitude to both pursue policies which
assist the retarded, and to engage in activities which burden them in an incidental
manner.
In July, 1980, Jan Hannah, Vice President and part owner of Cleburne Living
Centers, Inc. (CLC), purchased a home
with the intention ofleasing it to CLC. It
was anticipated that the building would
house 13 retarded men and women under
the constant supervision of the CLC staff.
The city informed CLC that a special use
permit was required for the construction
of"[h]ospitals for the feebleminded", and
that the group home proposed by CLC
should be classified as such an institution.
After holding a public hearing on CLC's
application, the City Council voted to
deny the special use permit.
CLC then filed suit in federal district
court alleging that the zoning ordinance
was invalid on its face and as applied be-

cause it discriminated against the mentally
retarded in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The district court, while finding that the
city council decision was motivated primarily by the fact that the residents of the
home would be mentally retarded, held
the ordinance constitutional both as written and as applied. Upon concluding that
no fundamental right was implicated, and
that mental retardation was neither a suspect nor quasi-suspect classification, the
court applied the "rational basis" standard
of review. The ordinance was found to be
rationally related to the city's interest in
the legal responsibility of CLC, the safety
and fears of the neighborhood residents,
and the number of residents within a home.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification, and
that the ordinance should be assessed under intermediate level scrutiny. City of

Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,

tally retarded. Second, the Court found
that the mentally retarded have not been
subjected to a history ofdiscrimination; by
reviewing Federal and Texas legislation
concerning the retarded, the Court concluded that the nature of existing legislation was indicative of society's intent to
assist the retarded and to provide for their
needs in a rational manner. Third, the
Court considered the existence of the ordinance itself inconsistent with the fifth circuit's reasoning that the retarded are politically powerless, and fourth, the Court
declined from setting a precedent which
would distinguish the retarded from any
other group with immutable characteristics
which had failed to illicit its desired legislative responses. By refraining from invoking quasi-suspect status upon the mentally
retarded, the Court indicated a belief that
government should be free to pursue policies which assist the retarded, and to engage in activities which burden them in an
incidental manner. Government need only

act in a manner which is neither arbitrary
nor capricious.
The Court reserved the issue of zoning
ordinance's facial validity, and addressed
the manner in which it was applied in this
case using the rational basis standard. The
Court found that the city council's denial
of the special permit based on the legal
responsibility ofCLC, the interests of the
neighborhood residents, and the number
of individuals living in a home was not
rational in light of the fact that the CLC
residents differed from other residents of
similar group houses only in their mental
retardation. This difference, in turn, posed
no special threat to the city's legitimate interests, and was therefore an unjustified
discriminatory practice.
There were two separate opinions in
City of Cleburne in addition to the majority
opinion. Justices Stevens and Burger,
while concurring in the Court's judgment,
declined to accept the traditional tiered
equal protection analysis in this case.
Tiered analysis, according to Stevens, is
an overly regimented way of explaining a
single principle. The Court should, in
Stevens' view, perform equal protection
analysis on a case by case basis, applying
the factors repeatedly emphasized by the
Court, such as political powerlessness, and
a history of purposeful discrimination.
Justice Marshall, with whom Justices
Brennan and Blackmun joined, also concurred in the judgment, but disagreed
with the majority's avoidance of the broad
constitutional issue of whether the ordinance was facially invalid. Justice Marshall
would have applied a more exacting level
of scrutiny, and held the ordinance facially
invalid as had the court of appeals.

- John D. Warfield

Inc., 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984). The
fifth circuit, in recognizing that mental retardation is relevant to many legislative actions, concluded that strict scrutiny was
not appropriate. However, the court also
concluded that the mentally retarded have
suffered from a history of mistreatment
which they have been politically powerless
to combat. This, and other factors, led the
court to hold the ordinance facially invalid
because it did not further any important
government interest. The court also went
on to hold the ordinance invalid as applied.
In its majority opinion, the Supreme
Court, after a brief review of the background of equal protection analysis, held
that the court of appeals erred in holding
mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification. First, the Court reasoned that the
judiciary is not properly suited to substantively judge legislative decisions concerning a group as large and diverse as the men-
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